In Spain's 'MIR' system, medical school graduates are ranked by their performance on a national exam and then sequentially choose from the available residency training positions. We took advantage of a unique survey of participants in the 2012 annual MIR cycle to analyze preferences under two different choice scenarios: the residency program actually chosen by each participant when it came her turn (the 'real') and the program that she would have chosen if all residency training programs had been available (the 'counterfactual'). Utilizing conditional logit models with random coefficients, we found significant differences in medical graduates' preferences between the two scenarios, particularly with respect to three specialty attributes: work hours/lifestyle, prestige among colleagues, and annual remuneration. In the counterfactual world, these attributes were valued preferentially by those nearer to the top, while in the real world, they were valued preferentially by graduates nearer to the bottom of the national ranking. Medical graduates' specialty preferences, which we conclude, are not intrinsically stable but depend critically on the 'rules of the game'. The MIR assignment system, by restricting choice, effectively creates an externality in which those at the bottom, who have fewer choices, want what those at the top already have.
INTRODUCTION
Studies of physician specialty choice have generally pursued a common research strategy. Enumerate the specific attributes to be studied and then use data on prospective or recent medical graduates' survey responses, experimental decisions, or choices of residency programs to determine which attributes are most important. The list of attributes considered by researchers is extensive: the length of the residency program, the anticipated debt upon completion of training, hospital versus ambulatory orientation, the expected financial remuneration, life style and work hours, prestige among colleagues or the general public, employability, malpractice litigation risk, direct patient interaction and continuity of care, research and teaching opportunities, and potential for career advancement (Dorsey et al., 2003; Gagne and Leger, 2005; Goldacre et al., 2010; Harris et al., 2013; Harris et al., 2005; Heikkila et al., 2011; Hurley, 1991; Nicholson, 2002; Rosenthal et al., 1994; Sivey et al., 2012; Thornton, 2000; Thornton and Esposto, 2003) .
In this article, we suggest that this research paradigm is inadequate. We posit that the institutional rules for allocating medical school graduates to different specialties -what we call 'contextual effects' -can themselves alter individuals' preferences. We focus on the current national system for allocating residency training positions in Spain, widely known as 'MIR', in which medical school graduates are ranked nationally and then sequentially choose from the available training positions.
We take advantage of a unique survey of participants in the 2012 annual MIR cycle to analyze preferences under two different choice scenarios: the residency program actually chosen by each participant when it came his or her turn (the 'real world') and the program that he or she would have chosen if all residency training programs had been available (the 'counterfactual world'). Utilizing conditional logit models with random coefficients, we find significant differences in medical graduates' preferences between the two scenarios, particularly with respect to three specialty attributes: work hours/lifestyle, prestige among colleagues, and annual remuneration. In the counterfactual world, these attributes were valued preferentially by those nearer to the top, while in the real world, they were valued preferentially by graduates nearer to the bottom of the national ranking. Medical graduates' specialty preferences, we conclude, are not intrinsically stable but depend critically on the 'rules of the game'. The MIR assignment system, by restricting choice, effectively creates an externality in which those at the bottom, who have fewer choices, want what those at the top already have.
SPAIN'S MIR SYSTEM OF ALLOCATING RESIDENCY TRAINING POSITIONS
The allocation of residency training positions in Spain is organized and regulated at the national level by a system widely known as MIR, which stands for 'médico interno residente', literally 'resident medical intern'. On an annual basis, the central government's Ministry of Health authorizes postgraduate training programs in 47 specialties. To be eligible for a residency training position, each 'candidate' must have an approved diploma from a Spanish or foreign medical school and take a national examination. Candidates are then ranked on the basis of their combined score, which is a weighted average of their national exam score (90%) and medical school grade point average (10%).
Once all training positions are authorized and all candidates are nationally ranked, the final phase of the annual MIR cycle functions essentially as a one-sided sequential allocation mechanism or 'serial dictatorship', in which the training programs play a purely passive role (Harris et al., 2014) . The top-ranked candidate logs into the MIR web portal and chooses his or her preferred residency training position from the entire set of nationally available training programs. Then the second-ranked candidate logs in and chooses from the remaining available residency positions, and the process continues iteratively until all training positions are exhausted or all candidates have elected positions. In contrast to the US allocation system, neither the candidates nor the training programs submit lists of preferred choices, and there is no matching.
The national rank ordering is a critical element of the MIR allocation scheme. With each annual MIR cycle, the graduates of the nation's top medical schools consistently attain the highest combined scores and thus get their first choices among the most highly valued residency training programs in such sought-after specialties as plastic surgery, dermatology, and cardiology (González López-Valcárcel et al., 2011 . At the bottom of the national ranking, the residual claimants are left with a Hobson's choice between enrolling in a residency in family and community medicine or dropping out in order to retake the national exam the following year (González López-Valcárcel et al., 2011) . In the 2002 MIR cycle, only 200 candidates within the top-ranked 3000 chose a residency position in family and community medicine, and by the 2012 cycle, only 50 had done so (Harris et al., 2014) .
The final selection phase of the MIR is a highly visible process. With each annual cycle, its progress is closely monitored in real time by the Spanish medical press, as individual specialties and hospitals are successively filled to capacity. During the 2015 selection process, for example, front-page headlines of Redacción Médica included the following:
1 'Neurology and cardiology, the upside and flipside in the top 500 MIR' (15 April); 'Dermatology and plastic surgery are filled up in the MIR. Pediatrics accelerates.' (16 April); 'The three favorite hospitals of the 2015 MIR' (20 April); '25 specialties still have vacancies' (22 April); and '14% of the MIR supply of Family and Community Medicine is assigned on the 8th day of selection.' (24 April).
DATA
Our principal database consisted of the individual assignments to residency training programs for all candidates participating in the 2012 MIR nationwide competition (for short, the '2012 MIR registry'). This database was provided by Spain's Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality. For each candidate, the registry contained the following: the candidate's national ranking (an ordinal number ranging from 1 up to the total number of participants); the residency program chosen (including medical specialty and training center); and the candidate's residential postal code, sex, nationality, and medical school attended, including foreign medical schools.
In the 2012 MIR competition, a total of 231 training centers offered residency positions in one or more of 44 specialties.
2 For hospital-based specialties, such as cardiology, neurology, and urology, these training centers were located in 181 different hospitals. For non-hospital-based specialties, such as family medicine, 3 occupational medicine, public health, and some psychiatry training programs, we grouped the training centers according to 50 provinces throughout the country.
Together, these training centers offered a total of 2527 distinct residency training programs, classified by specialty and center. With each residency training program offering multiple positions, there was a grand total of 6555 available residency positions nationwide. Among these, 1860 (28.4%) were residency positions in the specialty of family medicine. Initially, a total of 11,713 medical graduates passed the MIR exam in order to be eligible to opt for one of the 6555 training positions. Of these candidates, 5158 (44.0%) withdrew from the competition without choosing a residency, in many cases because their test scores were so low that they had no chance of choosing their desired specialty or training center. That left 6555 candidates for exactly as many training positions. A total of 4839 (73.8%) of these participating candidates were Spanish nationals, while the remaining 1716 (26.2%) were foreign nationals.
We supplemented the 2012 MIR registry with additional data on the characteristics of the 231 training centers. These included information on hospitals' bed capacity and high-technology facilities, derived from the official National Catalog of Hospitals of Spain 2011. We also used Google Maps to create a 50 × 50 matrix of travel times between the capital of a candidate's province of residence and the capital of the province in which each training center was located.
We matched the 2012 MIR registry database with two cross-sectional surveys specifically designed for this research project. The first was a survey of students in their final semester of medical school in Spain, administered in April 2011 (Harris et al., 2013) . This survey provided us with the perceived values of seven key attributes of each specialty, as detailed in Figure 1 . These included the following: the probability of obtaining employment (X 1 ), favorable working hours and working conditions (X 2 ), recognition by patients (X 3 ), prestige and recognition by colleagues (X 4 ), possibilities for advancement and professional development (X 5 ), average annual remuneration (X 6 ), and proportion of income derived from private practice (X 7 ). In earlier work (Harris et al., 2013) , we found that employability (X 1 ) had a significant impact on specialty choice in the context of Spain's economic crisis. In a nationalized healthcare system such as Spain, where employed physicians receive salaries negotiated through collective bargaining, the extent to which a physician can engage in outside private practice (X 7 ) is a superior proxy for earnings (X 6 ). As a measure of earnings, outside income is more orthogonal to the other specialty characteristics than total earnings. There is good evidence that professional prestige (X 4 ) is an important driver of the decision not to pursue a career in primary care medicine, independent of income (Kolstad, 2013) .
The second cross-sectional survey (for short, the '2012 post-MIR survey') was performed in May 2012 on those candidates who had just been assigned to residency positions in the 2012 MIR competition. These candidates belonged to the same cohort that answered the first survey as medical students in 2011. We asked them not only about their actual specialty/center selection but also about their preferred choice if they had been ranked first in the competition. We refer to the latter as a candidate's 'counterfactual' choice. We used respondents' e-mail addresses, voluntarily provided under our assurance of anonymity, to match respondents with the Figure 1 . Estimated values of seven attributes for each of 44 medical specialties. Source: 2011 survey of 978 final-year students in Spanish medical schools (Harris et al., 2013) . The introductory survey text was 'In this section, you'll define your profile of some medical specialties, including the one that you've just chosen as your first choice as well as others chosen at random. Think about your perceptions and expectations concerning each specialty.' The preamble to the two questions on attributes 6 and 7 was 'The following questions are about compensation. To facilitate your responses, recall that the average annual gross income of a full-time specialist in Family & Community Medicine with 10-15 years experience is currently about 60,000 euros.' The survey questions concerning each specific attribute were as follows: X1. Probability of Obtaining Employment. 'How would you rate the probability of obtaining work in the next three years, whether in the public or private sector, for an individual who became certified in this specialty today? (0 to 100%)'. This variable has been rescaled to 0-10. principal database. We thus had additional data from this survey on 3432 (or 52.4%) of the 6555 candidates in the 2012 MIR registry. In our econometric models, to be described in the next section, we dropped observations with missing values, leaving an estimation sample of 6254 MIR candidates, of whom 3117 (50%) were matched to the survey database and answered the counterfactual question on their preferred specialty and training center. Table I compares the characteristics of candidates in the 2012 MIR registry with participants in the 2012 post-MIR survey. As shown in the column entitled 'Two-Group Comparison', there was no significant difference between participants and non-participants with respect to Spanish nationality, and a marginally significant difference with respect to female gender. On the other hand, participants in the 2012 post-MIR survey were significantly more likely to be in the top half of the MIR rankings and tended to choose training programs closer to their own residence. As shown in the rightmost column of the table, a multivariate logistic model of participation showed significant odds ratios for all four characteristics. However, the probability of correctly predicting participation was 55.1%, close to that expected from a random draw.
For the 3117 candidates with complete data in both databases, Table II compares their assigned specialty choices in the MIR competition with their preferred ones. The tabulation is broken down into two subgroups: those candidates in the top 50% of the national rankings and those in the bottom 50%. For those in the top half, there is a high concordance between the assigned and preferred specialties, particularly for cardiology, plastic surgery, and dermatology, the three highly preferred specialties with a limited number of available training positions. For those candidates in the bottom half of the rankings, however, there is a markedly reduced concordance between assigned and preferred specialties. Among those assigned to family medicine, only 27.5% of respondents would have chosen this specialty if they had been ranked first. For those in the bottom half who were assigned to a specialty other than family medicine, only 42.8% would have preferred their assigned specialty, while almost no one would have chosen family medicine. In our econometric analysis of the 2012 MIR registry, the dependent variable was the training program actually chosen by each candidate (the real choice). In the 2012 post-MIR survey, the dependent variable was the training program that the candidate would have chosen if he or she had been top ranked (the counterfactual choice). In both analyses, the explanatory variables included the seven key attributes of the specialty; the characteristics of the training center (number of beds, availability of positron emission tomography in the affiliated hospital); the characteristics of the candidate, including gender, nationality and MIR ranking, interacted with specialty attributes; the distance from the candidate's residence to the training center, measured in minutes of travel time between provincial capitals; and an indicator variable equal to 1 if the candidate's residence and the training center were located in the same province. The complete list of explanatory variables is shown in Table III. 4. DISCRETE CHOICE MODELING Our estimation strategy was based upon a conditional logit model with random parameters, also called the 'mixed logit model ' (McFadden and Train, 2000; Train, 2009) . To analyze the data from the 2012 MIR registry, we accounted for the endogeneity of the choice set available to each candidate as his or her turn came up in the MIR sequence. To analyze the data from the 2012 post-MIR survey, where respondents were asked to designate their preferred specialty under the counterfactual assumption that they had been ranked first, we assumed all candidates had the same, complete choice set.
We let P = {p j | j = 1, …, M} denote the set of distinct residency training programs, each identified by a particular specialty and location. Let C = {c i | i = 1, …, N} denote the set of candidates participating in the MIR sequential assignment process.
We first consider estimation of the mixed logit model with an endogenous choice set. We assume that the candidates are already ordered so that candidate c 1 is first to elect a training program, while candidate c N is last. Let P i denote the set of distinct residency training programs available to candidate c i when it is his or her turn to elect a program. Let y i denote the training program chosen by candidate c i . Given the unobserved parameter vector β, the probability that candidate c i chooses training program y i = p j ϵP i is given by the conditional logit model
where X ij is a vector of observed characteristics that candidate c i associates with program p j . Some elements of X ij may depend only on the specific training program and not on the candidate, such as the particular specialty or the facilities of the training center. Other elements may depend on both the program and the candidate, such as the distance of the candidate's home province from the training center. Included in the latter category are interactions between a candidate's characteristics (e.g., gender, nationality, and ranking) and a program's characteristics. We further assume that the vector of unobserved parameters β has a multivariate normal distribution β|μ, Σ~N(μ, Σ) with density function ϕ(β|μ, Σ). To simplify the notation, we let θ = (μ, Σ). Conditional on θ, the probability that candidate c i chooses training program y i = p j ∈ P i is therefore given by
As noted by Train (Train, 2009 ) and others, the parameters θ = (μ, Σ) can be estimated by maximum likelihood, where the integral in 2 can be computed by simulation. Let θ̂denote the maximum likelihood estimate Parameter estimates in boldface correspond to significant differences between Models II and III at the 5% level, based on Z-statistic: Z ¼ β̂I of θ and consider a specific candidate c i . Given his or her selected program y i , the characteristics X ij , and the estimate θ, the posterior density of β is given by
We employed the mixlogit routine in STATA to estimate θ̂via maximum likelihood (StataCorp, 2013) . We imposed the additional restriction that covariance matrix Σ takes the diagonal form Σ ¼ diag σ 2 1 ; …; σ 2 K ; 0; …; 0 À Á , where only the first K elements of the parameter vector β were assumed to be random. The decision as to which elements had random coefficients was empirically based. We first estimated a more general model in which all explanatory variables had random coefficients and then restricted the random coefficients of the explanatory variables to those with significant standard deviations at the 5% level. We also used the mixlbeta post-estimation routine programmed by Hole (Hole, 2007) to compute for each candidate c i the posterior mean value of β in 3, which we denote by the parameter vector β̂i.
We estimated the foregoing mixed logit model with an endogenous choice set on the actual choices of all 6254 candidates in the 2012 MIR registry. We designate this as Model I. We then estimated the same mixed logit model on the actual choices of the subset of 3117 candidates who also responded to the 2012 post-MIR survey. We designate this as Model II.
We next consider the application of the mixed logit model to the 2012 post-MIR survey data. In this case, each respondent made his or her counterfactual choice of preferred residency training program from the entire choice set P = {p j | j = 1, …, M}. Given the unobserved parameter β, the probability that candidate c i preferred training program y i = p j ϵP is given by the logit model
Given θ = (μ, Σ), the probability that candidate c i preferred training program y i = p j ϵP is given by the same mixture of conditional probabilities shown in 2. We designate this as Model III.
We compared the estimates θ̂derived from each of the three models. In particular, we compared the estimates from Models I and II to assess whether the 3117 candidates who responded to the 2012 post-MIR survey had preferences distinct from the entire population. Comparison of coefficients was based
, where β̂I ð Þ k and β̂I I ð Þ k are the respective estimates of the k-th element of the parameter vector β from the two models, while σ̂2
are their respective standard errors. We used the same test statistics to compare the estimates from Models II and III, that is, to determine whether the preferences of the 3117 candidates in the real world differed from the preferences of the same 3117 candidates in the counterfactual world.
We also used graphical methods to compare the estimates from Models II and III in order to further assess whether the expansion of choices in the counterfactual scenario altered the preferences of the 3117 candidates.
Concretely, let β̂I I ð Þ i1 denote the posterior mean value of the coefficient of X 1 (employability) for candidate i in Model II. Let β̂I
, and β̂I I ð Þ i1S , respectively, denote the corresponding posterior mean values of the interactions X 1 * Ranking, X 1 * Female, and X 1 * Spanish for the same candidate. If candidate i is a female Spanish national, then the relative effect of a unit increase in X 1 on the probability of choosing a training program, based upon Model II, is r̂I
, with an analogous definition for r̂I 
Model I versus Model II
In each of the three models, we permitted the following explanatory variables to have random coefficients: X 1 , likelihood of obtaining employment; X 3 , recognition by patients; and X 7 , proportion of income derived from private practice. The complete results for all three models with all interaction terms are reported in Table III . The corresponding results without interaction terms are reported in the Appendix.
Model I correctly predicted 34% of the specialty choices of the 6254 candidates, while Model II correctly predicted 31% of the specialty choices of the 3117 candidates. These concordance rates were significantly higher than the 2% concordance rate expected from a completely uninformative model of choice among 44 specialties. Aggregating specialties into groups, we found that Model I correctly predicted that 80% of candidates would elect a medical specialty and 52% would elect a surgical specialty, while the corresponding group concordance rates for Model II were 79% and 52%, respectively. For the specialty of family medicine, in particular, the concordance between observed and predicted was 90% for Model I and 87% for Model II. None of the estimated coefficients of Model II differed significantly from those of Model I.
In Model I, all location-related variables and hospital characteristics were highly significant and had the expected signs. All specialty attributes had significant coefficients except for annual remuneration (X 6 ). When normalized by their sample standard deviations, three attributes had the largest quantitative effects: the probability of obtaining employment (X 1 ), prestige among colleagues (X 4 ), and the proportion of compensation earned in private practice (X 7 ). Unexpectedly, recognition among patients (X 3 ) showed a negative sign.
With respect to interactions between specialty attributes and the characteristics of the candidates, Spanish nationals valued employability (X 1 ) more than foreign candidates. Higher-ranked candidates (with lower absolute values of Ranking) attached more importance to employability than lower-ranked candidates. Women, foreign candidates, and lower-ranked candidates placed more value on prestige among colleagues (X 4 ) than their counterparts. Women, Spanish nationals, and higher-ranked candidates attached more importance to income from private practice (X 7 ) than their respective counterparts.
Model II versus Model III
Model III correctly predicted 31% of the specialty choices of the 3117 candidates. For family medicine, the concordance between observed and predicted was 98%. Comparing Models II and III, we found no significant differences in 24 of 33 estimated coefficients. Of the remaining nine pairs of coefficients, which are shown in boldface in Table III , four corresponded to interactions between specialty attributes and the candidate's MIR ranking, where the highest-ranked candidate had the lowest value of Ranking equal to 1. For three of the interaction terms (with X 2 , X 4 , and X 6 ), the sign reversed from positive in Model II to negative in Model III. For the interaction term with X 3 , the estimated coefficient is positive in both models but five times larger in Model III.
In Figure 2 , we compare Models II and III on a candidate-specific basis. We display the relative effects of increases in two different attributes on the probability of choosing a training program, as derived from the estimated posterior mean values of the coefficients. As shown in the top row, nearly all candidates valued employability (X 1 ). This effect was more pronounced among Spanish nationals. Moreover, the importance of employability was enhanced under the constraints imposed by the MIR allocation system. As shown in the bottom row, most candidates valued remuneration from private practice (X 7 ). For foreign candidates, nearly all of the mass lies to the right of the 45°line drawn on the plot, that is, the restrictions on choice in the actual MIR competition increased the importance of private practice remuneration in comparison with the counterfactual world (equivalently, r̂I
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The critical explanatory variable in our analysis is the candidate's MIR ranking. It serves not only as an indicator of the candidate's human capital -as reflected in his or her combined score in the national exam and his or her medical school grade point average -but also signals his or her relative position in the selection queue. Under the former interpretation, Ranking functions essentially as an intrinsic taste variable modifying a candidate's preferences. Under the latter interpretation, Ranking functions as a contextual variable, indicating how a candidate's preferences are influenced by the choices of those who ranked ahead of her.
In Model I, the interaction terms with Ranking were significantly positive (P < 0.01) for attributes X 4 and X 6 , and significantly negative for X 1 , X 5 , and X 7 . Interpreting a candidate's ranking as a taste variable, we would conclude that a candidate with less human capital (that is, with higher values of Ranking) intrinsically cared more about prestige among colleagues (X 4 ) and monetary compensation (X 6 ) and less about employability (X 1 ), professional development (X 5 ), and private practice (X 7 ). On the other hand, interpreting a candidate's ranking as a contextual variable, we would conclude instead that the fact of being relegated to the back of the queue altered these candidates' preferences.
If we had only the candidate's real-world choices (Models I and II), we would be unable to distinguish between these two interpretations of Ranking. The results of Model III, however, help us solve the identification Figure 2 . Relative effect of a 10-percentage point increase in the probability of obtaining employment (X 1 , top row) and a 10-percentage point increase in the proportion of income from private practice (X 7 , bottom row) on the probability of specialty choice: Model II versus Model III. In each row, the left-hand scatterplot shows the effects among foreign graduates, while the right-hand scatterplot shows the effects among Spanish nationals. Within each scatterplot, each candidate corresponds to a single point, where men are blue points and women are brown points. The vertical axis measures the estimated relative effect r̂I problem. In Table III , we found that the interactions between Ranking and favorable lifestyle (X 2 ), prestige among colleagues (X 4 ), and annual remuneration (X 6 ) reversed sign in the counterfactual scenario. In a counterfactual world without any restrictions on choice (Model III), these attributes are desired primarily by those with the best qualifications. But in the real world where the highest scorers go first (Model II), they become increasingly desirable to those candidates with fewer options.
These contextual effects may reflect the operation of market forces. As higher-ranked candidates grabbed up the residencies in specialties with more favorable lifestyles, more collegial prestige, and better income prospects, the scarcity of training positions with these attributes made them even more valuable to those at the bottom. On the other hand, such contextual effects could operate outside the price system. The mere fact that the top candidates favor training programs in high-prestige specialties makes them even more valuable to the bottom candidates. Restricting choice thus created an externality in which those at the bottom, who have fewer choices, want what those at the top already have (Bikhchandani et al., 1992) .
The observed differences between Models II and III represent violations of the axiom of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) that is implicit in conditional logit models. The conditional logit model with random coefficients does accommodate violations of this axiom a priori. However, for any given candidate c i with specific choice parameters β i , the model still violates the IIA axiom a posteriori. Figure 2 demonstrates that, at the individual level, the elimination of some choices in the real world (Model II) alters the relative preferences expressed in the unconstrained counterfactual world (Model III).
The estimated parameters in Table III correspond to the coefficients of the candidates' underlying utility functions. Our test of the IIA axiom requires a comparison of these coefficients, and not the marginal effects of changes in the explanatory variables. When a nonlinear discrete choice model contains interaction terms, as does our implementation of the mixed logit model here, marginal effects are not necessarily proportional to the estimated coefficients of the underlying utility function (Norton et al., 2004) .
While violations of IIA are usually attributed to substitution effects resulting from unobserved heterogeneity, our results suggest an alternative explanation. Given the choice parameters β i for candidate c i , his or her latent utility of training position j is given by u ij = X ij β i + e ij , where X ij represents the characteristics of the training position and e ij is an error term with a type-1 extreme value distribution. To generate the conditional logit model 1 previously, one needs to assume further that the error terms e ij are independent and identically distributed (McFadden, 1974) . This assumption breaks down when we assume that two different training positions share common but unobserved characteristics, so that Cov(e ij , e ik ) ≠ 0 for j ≠ k. More concretely, consider a candidate c i who would have chosen residency j but for the fact that other higher-ranked candidates had already taken all the available training slots. Suppose that another residency k that shares common unobserved characteristics remains available. Then in the real world, the candidate would tend to choose residency k rather than distributing his or her choice probabilities over all of the remaining available training positions. This is the analog of the frequently cited 'red bus, blue bus' example, attributed to McFadden. Our finding of contextual effects in the MIR allocation scheme, however, suggests an alternative mechanism for violation of IIA based upon the lack of independence of the error terms e ij across candidates, namely, Cov(e ik , e jk ) ≠ 0 for i ≠ j.
Limitations of this study
This study has a number of limitations. First, we relied upon a one-time survey of students in their final year of medical school (Harris et al., 2013) to ascertain the values of the seven specialty attributes (X 1 -X 7 ). While the survey had a wide coverage of all 27 of Spain's medical schools, we do not know whether candidates' valuations remained stable during the nearly 1-year period between the date of the survey (April 2011) and the moment of decision when they had to make their commitments (March 2012) . The intervening time typically spent in post-graduate courses preparing for the national exam may have altered candidates' perceptions of their specialty choices.
In addition, only half of the participants in the 2012 MIR cycle responded to our post-2012 MIR survey, and those who did respond tended to have a higher MIR ranking (Table I) . Still, the concordance of parameter imply that increased professional prestige and financial remuneration could increase the likelihood that a qualified medical school graduate will elect a career in family medicine.
Our finding of contextual effects suggests that the institutions designed to allocate residencies are not neutral with respect to preferences. In the MIR system, the choices made by those candidates at the top may not simply remove options from the remaining candidates' choice sets. They may change the remaining candidates' preferences as well. This raises the possibility that the MIR system itself has exacerbated the shortage of qualified primary care physicians in Spain.
The traditional Spanish practice of real-time dissemination of the ongoing results of the MIR competition serves as a vehicle to apprise those candidates at the bottom of what specialties are preferred by those at the top and thus facilitates the contextual effects that we have observed. In the USA, by contrast, all assignments are announced simultaneously on a single 'match day', rather than sequentially, and the preferences of candidates and training programs are not made public. Still, we do not know whether the two-sided mechanism prevailing in the USA and other countries, where training programs actively participate in the selection process, may enhance or attenuate the contextual effects observed here.
Our results suggest a strategy for studying the effects of alternative public policies, based upon simulation of the choice models estimated here. In the evaluation of alternative policies that depart from the current MIR allocation, it will be important to consider not only the potential efficiency gains from assigning more qualified candidates to primary care but also the potential equity losses from preventing those who scored highest to choose first (Harris et al., 2014) .
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